Another round of talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda is reportedly expected to take place in Geneva on November 19 , as disagreements persist over implementing the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity. Africa Intelligence reported that the two sides were expected to meet, although Al Jazeera has been unable to independently confirm the gathering.
At the heart of the impasse are two commitments: neutralising the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Rwanda lifting its defensive measures. The governments disagree not only over progress on these obligations but also on what would constitute compliance.
The Washington Accords, signed on December 4, 2025, build on the peace agreement signed by the two governments on June 27, 2025, and the Declaration of Principles of April 25, 2025.
The commitments include neutralising the FDLR, Rwanda’s disengagement of forces and the lifting of defensive measures, respect for territorial integrity, and an end to support for armed groups.
Implementation is overseen by the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM), which includes representatives of the DRC, Rwanda, the United States, Qatar, Togo in its role as African Union mediator, and the AU Commission. The mechanism coordinates security measures, including efforts to locate the FDLR.
The JSCM has held several rounds of meetings, but progress has largely focused on procedures, monitoring and verification rather than resolving the central disagreement.
At meetings in July, August and September 2026, the parties discussed the security situation in eastern DRC, information-sharing, monitoring arrangements and the disarmament and demobilisation of FDLR members. They also considered ways to strengthen verification. However, they have yet to agree on what would constitute fulfilment of their respective security obligations.
Rwanda says it has begun implementing its commitments. Addressing the United Nations Security Council on September 29 , Rwanda’s Permanent Representative, Martin Ngoga, said Kigali had started lifting its defensive measures.
He maintained, however, that the FDLR remained active in eastern DRC and continued to cooperate with Congolese forces and other armed groups. Rwanda considers ending this alleged cooperation essential to implementing the agreement.
Kinshasa, meanwhile, points to its efforts to disarm and demobilise FDLR fighters. On July 28 , the Congolese government announced a protocol with a faction of the armed wing of the FDLR, setting out arrangements for disarmament and demobilisation.
Government spokesman Patrick Muyaya told Al Jazeera that the process formed part of the commitments under the Washington agreements.
Rwanda rejected the arrangement. Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe called it a “crude manipulation”, while Ngoga argued that an agreement with one faction could not satisfy the broader commitment to neutralise the group.
The disagreement exposes the central problem: Kinshasa presents the protocol as progress towards neutralisation, while Kigali argues that disarming one faction does not demonstrate that the FDLR’s wider operational capacity has been dismantled. The parties have yet to establish a shared standard for measuring progress.
On October 28 , the US sanctioned Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and Zigama Credit and Savings Society, a Rwandan financial institution, over alleged support for the M23 armed group in eastern DRC.
Washington accused the ministry of directing Rwandan forces operating alongside M23 and providing the group with military equipment and other assistance. It also alleged that Zigama facilitated financial and logistical support for Rwanda’s military activities.
The US Treasury said the sanctions were intended to hold Rwanda accountable for its commitments under the Washington Accords.
Kigali rejected the allegations. Government spokesperson Yolande Makolo said the commitments concerning the FDLR remained unfulfilled and called for all parties to be held accountable.
The sanctions increased pressure on Rwanda and underscored Washington’s determination to push for implementation of the agreement it helped broker.
The Washington Accords address security commitments between Rwanda and the DRC. However, negotiations between Kinshasa, M23 and its ally, the Congo River Alliance (AFC), follow a separate track facilitated by Qatar under the Doha process.
The two tracks are distinct but connected. The June 2025 peace agreement recognises that resolving the conflict in eastern DRC also requires addressing non-state armed groups.
The Doha process produced a Declaration of Principles in July 2025 and a framework for a comprehensive peace agreement covering ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian access, security arrangements, disarmament and the restoration of state authority.
The political landscape shifted on October 12, 2026, when the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN) was established. The new movement was presented as replacing the AFC/M23 political-military structure and bringing together its political and military components. In its founding declaration, the FRN announced the dissolution of the AFC and said it would assume the coalition’s rights and obligations, including commitments under the Doha process.
Although M23’s political and military leadership has been incorporated into the new structure, the founding declaration does not explicitly spell out the separate organisational status of the armed movement. The distinction between M23 as an armed movement and the broader political-military coalition remains important, particularly in determining who represents the nongovernmental side in the Doha negotiations and who is responsible for implementing commitments made under that process.
Alongside the peace agreement, the US and the DRC signed a strategic partnership on December 4, 2025, to expand economic cooperation, including investment in mining, critical minerals and infrastructure.
The partnership reflects Washington’s interest in the DRC’s copper and cobalt reserves and efforts to diversify mineral supply chains. Following a steering committee meeting in Paris on November 6 , the two governments reported growing interest from US companies. Kinshasa has stressed that the partnership should be judged by tangible investments rather than announcements.
The Washington process follows decades of efforts to address conflict in eastern DRC and tensions between the two neighbours.
The 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement sought to end the Second Congo War and provide for the withdrawal of foreign forces and disarmament of armed groups. Among those groups were remnants of the former Rwandan armed forces and members of the Interahamwe militia who fled to the DRC after the 1994 genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda. Elements of these forces later formed the FDLR, established in 2000.
The 2002 Pretoria Agreement committed Rwanda to withdrawing its troops from the DRC, while Kinshasa undertook to address the presence of former Rwandan armed forces and Interahamwe elements. The 2007 Nairobi Communique and the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework renewed commitments to disarm armed groups, respect territorial integrity and strengthen regional cooperation.
Those initiatives struggled to overcome mutual security concerns and the continued presence of armed groups. The FDLR remains a central point of contention nearly three decades after its origins in eastern DRC.
The next round of talks will test whether Kigali and Kinshasa can move beyond competing interpretations of their obligations and agree on a credible, verifiable process for implementing the Washington Accords. Without agreement on how compliance is measured, progress on the ground risks lagging far behind the diplomatic framework.