Enterprise AI security gets considerably harder the moment an AI system stops recommending what someone should do and starts doing it.
An agent can read a repository, retrieve a document, query a database, call an MCP tool, modify code, send a message, or initiate a workflow. It may move between several of those systems while pursuing a single objective. And because the execution plan is generated dynamically, security teams cannot always predict the exact sequence of actions in advance.
Dash Security is purpose-built around the security implications of agents becoming active participants in enterprise environments. Its coverage begins before an incident occurs. Dash continuously discovers the organisation’s agentic layer, including approved and unapproved agents, AI platforms, MCP servers, skills, plugins, and extensions. That includes shadow AI as well as sanctioned tools being accessed through personal or otherwise untrusted accounts.
Discovery is connected to governance rather than operating as a separate inventory exercise. Dash evaluates agents and their supply chain according to factors such as capabilities, autonomy, context, and risk. Security teams can use that information to establish policies around identities, tools, data, and actions and to govern individual MCP tools or other components that should be sanctioned, reviewed, or blocked.
Where Dash becomes particularly differentiated is during execution. AI agents maintain context as they work. A session can begin in an IDE or workstation, interact with tools, reach cloud infrastructure, and continue into enterprise applications. Dash follows this session and captures the relationship between the user’s objective, the agent’s reasoning, its tool use, its actions, and the resulting impact.
Zenity focuses specifically on securing AI agents across their lifecycle, from discovery and posture management through runtime detection and enforcement. The platform is designed for environments where employees and development teams can create or adopt agents through enterprise AI platforms, low-code systems, copilots, custom development, and other agentic technologies.
That creates a governance challenge before runtime security even begins. Security teams need to determine which agents exist, what they can access, how they authenticate, what tools they can invoke, and whether their configuration creates excessive exposure. Zenity provides visibility into this estate and helps organisations identify risky agent configurations and permissions.
Prisma AIRS approaches agent security as part of a broader enterprise AI security architecture. Its Agent Security capabilities are designed to give organisations visibility and control as agents move from experimentation into production, including controls around identity, behaviour, tools, and actions.
An enterprise agent may depend on code, models, skills, MCP servers, credentials, APIs, and external services. Prisma AIRS can assess components in this ecosystem while providing runtime controls around deployed agents. The platform also benefits from sitting inside a wider AI security portfolio.
HiddenLayer’s approach starts with a practical observation: once an AI agent can make decisions and execute actions, protecting only the prompt and response is insufficient. Its AI Runtime Security platform therefore extends visibility into autonomous execution.
Agentic Runtime Visibility helps security teams understand what agents are doing across their workflows. Agentic Investigation and Threat Hunting provides context for examining suspicious activity, while Agentic Detection and Enforcement allows organisations to respond when agent behaviour becomes unsafe.
Check Point’s AI security capabilities, strengthened by Lakera’s technology, provide another route to securing agents from both the application and runtime perspectives. For agentic environments, the platform combines controls over the AI interaction itself with defenses around the actions an agent attempts to perform.
This distinction matters because the security problem changes once tools enter the workflow. Consider an agent authorised to search an internal knowledge base and send emails. Neither capability is inherently dangerous. If an indirect prompt injection embedded inside a retrieved document instructs the agent to search for confidential information and email it externally, however, those legitimate capabilities become part of an attack chain.
Noma Security addresses agentic AI as part of a wider AI and data security platform, with controls spanning discovery, posture, supply-chain risk, and runtime protection. Its agent security capabilities are particularly relevant to organisations concerned about the rapidly expanding ecosystem surrounding autonomous systems.
An enterprise may know that it has approved a particular agent but still lack visibility into every MCP server, tool, model, dataset, or external component connected to it. Those dependencies can materially change what the agent can access and what an attacker might manipulate.
Prompt Security, now part of SentinelOne, focuses on protecting enterprise AI usage across employees, applications, and agentic systems. That makes its perspective particularly useful for organisations where agent adoption is not happening through one centrally controlled development program.
AI can enter through browser applications, coding assistants, enterprise copilots, custom applications, extensions, and emerging agentic tools. Security teams need visibility into that usage before they can consistently enforce policy. Prompt Security provides controls around AI interactions to identify sensitive-data exposure, prompt injection, inappropriate AI usage, and other policy violations.
The most useful way to compare these tools is not by counting features. It is to identify where an enterprise loses control as an agent moves from installation to execution.
Employees can install coding agents, use SaaS agents, connect personal accounts, activate browser extensions, or build custom agents without waiting for a centralized AI program.
Security teams cannot protect an agent they do not know exists. This makes continuous agent and shadow AI discovery increasingly foundational to enterprise agentic security.
An agent is rarely a self-contained application. Its effective capabilities can be influenced by models, skills, plugins, MCP servers, tools, extensions, APIs, and other components. Adding one new integration can materially change what the agent is capable of accessing or executing.
Supply-chain governance therefore needs to evaluate more than the agent itself.
Agents often operate using legitimate credentials. This creates a subtle problem: authentication can prove that an action was authorised without proving that the action was appropriate.
An agent with permission to read a database and permission to communicate externally may still create a breach if it combines those permissions in a way the user never intended.
This is where static governance becomes insufficient. Agents interpret instructions and construct their execution paths dynamically. Security controls need enough runtime context to understand tool calls, data access, commands, actions, and interactions as they occur.
Intent is the layer traditional security tools struggle to represent. The same command can be safe during one agent session and dangerous during another. The distinction depends on why the agent is executing it and whether the action remains aligned with the objective it was given.
Rather than asking which product has the longest feature list, enterprise teams can compare where each platform concentrates its controls.
Traditional AI security has often concentrated on models, prompts, and application outputs. Agentic AI introduces an additional security layer because the AI system can translate its decisions into actions.
This difference does not make existing AI security controls obsolete. Prompt-injection defenses, data protection, model security, red teaming, and AI posture management remain important.
Agentic environments add another requirement: organisations must secure the transition from AI decision to enterprise action .
An LLM that produces an inappropriate response creates one type of risk. An autonomous agent that interprets malicious content and then uses valid credentials to modify a production system creates another.
That is why identity, permissions, tool governance, runtime behaviour, and execution context become much more prominent as enterprises move from copilots toward autonomous agents.
The strongest security programs will therefore combine established AI application protections with controls designed specifically for the autonomy and connectivity of agentic systems.
Traditional applications execute workflows defined primarily in code. AI agents can interpret objectives and determine their own sequence of actions at runtime. As a result, two identical tool calls can have very different security implications depending on the session. Agent security therefore requires contextual monitoring and controls that can evaluate dynamic behaviour.
Intent drift occurs when an agent’s behaviour moves away from the objective the user originally gave it. This can happen because of indirect prompt injection, malicious retrieved content, incorrect reasoning, conflicting instructions, or other influences. Intent-aware security attempts to identify this divergence before inappropriate agent actions create meaningful impact.
Shadow AI includes agents, platforms, extensions, MCP servers, or other AI components used without sufficient IT or security oversight. These systems may access enterprise data or operate with significant permissions without established governance. Continuous discovery helps security teams identify the real agentic estate before applying posture, policy, and runtime controls.
MCP servers can significantly expand what an AI agent can access and do by connecting it with tools and external resources. A risky or compromised MCP component can therefore increase an agent’s attack surface. Enterprises need visibility into MCP servers and individual tools, along with policies governing which agents can use them.